272 lines
26 KiB
Markdown
272 lines
26 KiB
Markdown
# evelyn-iou-burner-service Specification
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## Purpose
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Defines the Evelyn-specific service that safely converts prioritized wallet assets into Evelyn IOU, burns the complete visible EVE balance, and announces only finalized burns without automatically repeating transactions whose outcomes may be unknown.
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## Requirements
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### Requirement: Evelyn-specific public service boundary
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The system SHALL expose an empty lifecycle-free `EvelynIOUBurnerService` under `com.fanitas.evelyn.service.burner` as the typed domain service and Registry view until external domain operations exist, and SHALL keep its reference implementation under `com.fanitas.evelyn.service.burner.impl.ref`. The same reference implementation object SHALL implement both `EvelynIOUBurnerService` and `NenjimProcess`; the Hub SHALL start it only through its `NenjimProcess` view. Neither the service interface nor the implementation SHALL expose a general stop, restart, worker-control, or other lifecycle operation. The service SHALL remain specific to Evelyn IOU and SHALL NOT introduce a generic token-burner abstraction, burner-specific input interfaces, records, or class hierarchies.
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#### Scenario: Downstream lifecycle consumer
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- **WHEN** a downstream component depends on the Evelyn burner API
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- **THEN** it receives a typed component contract with no callable lifecycle or domain operation and does not depend on reference-implementation types or a generic burner model
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#### Scenario: Input model remains domain-level
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- **WHEN** the Hub configures accepted buyback currencies while constructing the process implementation
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- **THEN** it uses existing `MoneyAmount` values rather than burner-specific Solana, SPL-token, or input-asset types
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### Requirement: Ordered AssetAZ input configuration
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The authoritative constructor SHALL accept a non-null ordered `List<MoneyAmount>` named `inputCurrencyMinimumReserves`, defensively copy it without changing order, and interpret inclusion as acceptance, list position as priority, each `currencyType().id()` as the authoritative AssetAZ identity, and each `amount()` as the minimum balance that must remain. It SHALL ignore supplied currency name and symbol metadata by resolving each UUID through the injected Currency Identity Service and using the canonical returned currency for processing. The constructor SHALL also accept a non-null `List<MoneyAmount>` named `inputCurrencyMaximumSwapAmounts`, defensively copy its values, and match each maximum to an accepted input by canonical currency UUID, independently of maximum-list order or supplied metadata. Each maximum SHALL be expressed in that same currency's own units. Empty reserves and maxima lists SHALL be valid and SHALL still permit directly deposited EVE to be burned.
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#### Scenario: Stale configured metadata
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- **WHEN** a configured `MoneyAmount` carries a known UUID but stale name or symbol metadata
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- **THEN** the service processes the current canonical currency resolved for that UUID
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#### Scenario: Priority is preserved
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- **WHEN** multiple configured entries have spendable balances and usable Solana data
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- **THEN** the earliest entry in the defensively copied list is the only input selected in that iteration
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#### Scenario: Empty input list
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- **WHEN** no buyback inputs are configured but the wallet contains EVE
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- **THEN** the service skips input selection and still evaluates the complete EVE balance for burning
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#### Scenario: Maximum list order is independent
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- **WHEN** maxima are supplied in a different order from the reserve list or carry stale display metadata for known UUIDs
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- **THEN** each input receives the maximum for its UUID and reserve-list priority is preserved
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#### Scenario: Caller changes its configuration lists
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- **WHEN** a caller changes either supplied list after construction
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- **THEN** the accepted currencies, their priority, reserves and maxima remain as validated during construction
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### Requirement: Complete constructor validation
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Construction SHALL require all injected services, both input configuration lists, and durations to be non-null; every list entry, entry amount, entry currency, and currency UUID to be non-null; each reserve to be zero or greater; each maximum to be strictly positive; each UUID to be known to the injected Currency Identity Service; UUIDs to be unique within each list; the maximum UUID set to exactly equal the accepted reserve UUID set; and EVE not to be an input currency. It SHALL require slippage to be from 0 through 10000 basis points inclusive, `maximumPriceAge` to be greater than zero milliseconds, and both finalization timeout and iteration interval to be positive and non-zero.
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Every configured non-SOL UUID SHALL resolve through reverse CIS lookup to exactly one external reference in the `solana-mint` namespace, and that reference's external ID SHALL be non-null and non-blank. Construction SHALL fail for a missing, ambiguous, null, or blank non-SOL mint representation. These burner-specific rules SHALL NOT change the general-purpose `MoneyAmount` contract.
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#### Scenario: Valid configuration
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- **WHEN** every dependency and value is valid, reserves are non-negative, every accepted input has exactly one positive maximum, UUIDs are distinct and known within each list, EVE is absent, and every non-SOL input has one non-blank Solana mint reference
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- **THEN** construction succeeds and preserves the configured priority order
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#### Scenario: Invalid reserve or operating limit
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- **WHEN** a reserve is negative or null, a token maximum is null or non-positive, slippage is outside its inclusive range, maximum price age is non-positive, or either duration is null or non-positive
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- **THEN** construction fails before a worker or transaction is created
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#### Scenario: Invalid input identity
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- **WHEN** an entry or its currency or UUID is null, a UUID is unknown or duplicated, or the EVE UUID is configured as input
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- **THEN** construction fails with a diagnostic identifying the invalid configuration
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#### Scenario: Non-SOL representation is not unique and usable
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- **WHEN** a configured non-SOL currency has zero or multiple `solana-mint` references or its sole external ID is null or blank
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- **THEN** construction fails without adding mint or token-program selection to Evelyn's configuration model
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#### Scenario: Maximum configuration is incomplete or ambiguous
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- **WHEN** a maximum is missing for an accepted input, duplicated by UUID, or supplied for an unaccepted currency
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- **THEN** construction fails before a worker or transaction is created
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#### Scenario: Invalid maximum identity or value
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- **WHEN** a maximum entry, amount, currency or UUID is null, or its UUID is unknown or resolves to an invalid canonical identity
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- **THEN** construction fails with a diagnostic identifying the invalid maximum configuration
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### Requirement: Fixed Evelyn domain values and internally resolved integration values
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The service SHALL fix the EVE mint as `meveYG2iXYSkgSUn1T1uxcthH1EGMZdRHGgCntXZA3Y`, construct the EVE/USDT notification-price pair from canonical CIS resolutions of the stable EVE and USDT UUIDs, and use fixed notification wording. Native SOL SHALL be identified only by the stable SOL UUID; when sent to Jupiter, its input mint SHALL be the canonical CIS Solana-mint reference `So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112`. Mint addresses, token programs, price pairs, notification wording, and a separate SOL reserve SHALL NOT be constructor configuration.
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#### Scenario: Native SOL configuration
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- **WHEN** a configured input UUID is the stable SOL UUID
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- **THEN** the service reads the native wallet balance and later supplies Jupiter with the CIS-resolved canonical SOL/WSOL mint rather than treating SOL as an SPL-token holding
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#### Scenario: Fixed EVE behavior
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- **WHEN** the service evaluates a burn and notification
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- **THEN** it uses the fixed EVE mint and the canonical EVE/USDT pair without accepting replacements through construction
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### Requirement: Immediate sequential fixed-delay lifecycle
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Each reference implementation instance SHALL own at most one dedicated background worker. A successful Hub-owned `NenjimProcess.start()` SHALL begin the first iteration immediately; every later iteration SHALL begin only after the previous iteration completes and the configured fixed delay elapses; and iterations SHALL never overlap. A repeated process start while active SHALL NOT create another worker. If scheduling the worker fails during startup, the implementation SHALL stop the newly created executor, clear its worker reference and process-local state, and report startup failure.
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Pending swap/burn information and manual swap/burn suspension flags SHALL be process-local only. A complete process restart SHALL clear those states. The public JavaDoc SHALL disclose that restart loses reconciliation state and can weaken duplicate prevention until unknown transactions have been reconciled externally. Neither the service interface nor the implementation SHALL expose ordinary stop or restart operations.
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#### Scenario: First and later iterations
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- **WHEN** the Hub starts the Burner process and one iteration takes longer than usual
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- **THEN** the first iteration starts without initial delay and the next starts only after completion plus the configured interval
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#### Scenario: Active service is started again
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- **WHEN** `NenjimProcess.start()` is called while the instance already owns an active worker
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- **THEN** the call is rejected without creating an overlapping worker
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#### Scenario: Explicit lifecycle reset
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- **WHEN** a complete process restart occurs after pending or suspended process-local state has been externally reconciled
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- **THEN** the new process begins without that prior in-memory state and reloads wallet and chain state normally
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### Requirement: Pending burn is handled before all new work
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At the start of an iteration, if a prior burn signature is pending, the service SHALL only await that exact signature at `FINALIZED`. It SHALL submit no swap or burn in that iteration. An unknown timeout or I/O outcome SHALL retain the pending state and end the iteration; definitive success SHALL make the one associated notification attempt and end the iteration; and definitive on-chain failure SHALL log the slot and complete failure details, clear pending state, send no notification, and defer any new wallet decision to a later iteration.
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#### Scenario: Pending result remains unknown
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- **WHEN** awaiting the retained signature times out or fails through I/O
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- **THEN** the service retains that signature and performs no swap, burn, or notification in the iteration
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#### Scenario: Pending burn succeeds
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- **WHEN** the retained signature reaches `FINALIZED` with a successful outcome
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- **THEN** the service performs its sole notification attempt and does no other transaction work in that iteration
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#### Scenario: Pending burn fails definitively
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- **WHEN** the retained signature reaches `FINALIZED` with an on-chain failure
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- **THEN** the service logs its slot and complete failure details, clears it without notification, and waits until a later iteration before evaluating another burn
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### Requirement: Prioritized input inspection with internal Solana translation
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Unless swaps are suspended, an iteration SHALL inspect configured input entries in order until it finds the first usable candidate. For every entry it SHALL resolve the configured UUID to its canonical currency. Native SOL SHALL use `getSolanaBalance().amount()` and nine-decimal precision. Every other input SHALL use its unique CIS-resolved Solana mint; the service SHALL inspect the mint account owner to detect the original SPL Token Program or Token-2022, use that program for wallet balance lookup, and obtain precision from Solana mint metadata. A missing SPL-token account SHALL equal zero balance.
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For each entry the service SHALL subtract its configured reserve and skip non-positive spendable balance. Missing or unusable balance, mint account, supported program, or mint metadata SHALL produce a warning and allow later configured entries to be examined. Interruption SHALL preserve the thread interrupt state and end processing rather than becoming a skipped candidate. Failure to select an input SHALL NOT prevent the later complete-EVE burn evaluation.
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#### Scenario: Missing token account
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- **WHEN** a configured non-SOL mint is valid but the wallet has no token account under its detected program
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- **THEN** that input is treated as a zero balance and later inputs are considered
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#### Scenario: Missing or unsupported mint account
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- **WHEN** a configured token's mint account is absent or owned by an unsupported program
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- **THEN** the service warns, skips that input, considers later priorities, and still reaches the EVE-balance step
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#### Scenario: Candidate read is interrupted
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- **WHEN** wallet, CIS-adjacent processing, or Solana access is interrupted while inspecting an input
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- **THEN** the service preserves interruption and ends processing without treating the input as an ordinary failure
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### Requirement: At most one confirmed swap attempt per iteration
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After selecting a positive exact amount, the service SHALL invoke the existing Jupiter exact-input operation once with the selected CIS-resolved input mint, fixed EVE output mint, selected amount, and configured slippage. Normal return SHALL be treated as already `CONFIRMED` and SHALL NOT trigger a second confirmation wait. Once invoked, no later input currency SHALL be attempted in that iteration regardless of success or failure, and the service SHALL proceed to reload the complete EVE balance whenever processing was not interrupted.
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A structured definitive on-chain swap failure SHALL be logged without suspending later-process swaps. A timed-out outcome or known-signature confirmation communication error SHALL retain process-local pending swap signature, canonical input, attempted amount and original validity metadata for later read-only reconciliation. Proven pre-submission errors SHALL permit a fresh attempt in a later scheduled iteration. An ambiguous post-submission error without a trustworthy signature SHALL retain manual suspension. Interruption SHALL preserve available pending context and propagate normally. No unknown outcome SHALL cause automatic rebuilding, re-signing or resubmission; pending swaps SHALL still permit existing EVE burn evaluation.
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#### Scenario: First swap fails definitively
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- **WHEN** the first attempted input returns a definitive on-chain failure
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- **THEN** no second input is attempted in that iteration, the EVE balance is still reloaded, and a later iteration may attempt a new swap
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#### Scenario: Swap outcome is unknown
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- **WHEN** the attempted swap times out, throws an I/O failure that permits unknown post-submission status, or is interrupted
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- **THEN** no equivalent or alternative swap is attempted while its outcome is unresolved; a known signature is checked in later iterations and a signature-less ambiguous submission requires manual reconciliation
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#### Scenario: Swap returns normally
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- **WHEN** Jupiter returns a successful result whose transaction already reached `CONFIRMED`
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- **THEN** the burner performs no additional confirmation wait and reloads the wallet instead of deriving its burn amount only from the returned output amount
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### Requirement: Complete visible EVE balance is eligible
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After the optional swap attempt, the service SHALL detect the fixed EVE mint's supported token program internally and reload the wallet's complete available EVE balance. A missing EVE mint account, unsupported program, absent wallet token account, zero balance, or negative/invalid balance SHALL cause no burn or notification in that iteration. Every positive complete balance SHALL be eligible without a minimum threshold, including EVE deposited before the iteration or visible after a failed or absent swap.
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#### Scenario: Existing EVE without buyback
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- **WHEN** no swap is performed but the wallet contains a positive EVE balance
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- **THEN** the service evaluates that complete balance for burning
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#### Scenario: EVE account is absent or empty
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- **WHEN** the wallet has no EVE token account or its complete balance is zero
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- **THEN** the iteration submits no burn and sends no notification
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### Requirement: Fresh EVE value is required before submission
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Immediately before a new burn, the service SHALL obtain the latest canonical EVE/USDT observation and require a positive price, non-null observation timestamp, and age no greater than `maximumPriceAge` milliseconds. USDT SHALL be treated as USD for notification value, calculated as the complete EVE amount multiplied by that fresh price. If the pair is unsupported or the observation is missing, invalid, or stale, the service SHALL warn, postpone the burn, send no notification, and retry only by re-evaluating state in a later scheduled iteration.
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#### Scenario: Fresh EVE price exists
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- **WHEN** a complete positive EVE balance and sufficiently fresh positive EVE/USDT observation are available
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- **THEN** the service calculates the notification's USD value from that complete balance before submitting the burn
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#### Scenario: EVE price is stale
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- **WHEN** EVE is present but its observation is older than the configured age limit
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- **THEN** the service leaves EVE unburned and sends no notification in that iteration
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### Requirement: Single complete-balance burn submission and pending state
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For a positive EVE balance with a usable price, the service SHALL call the wallet burn operation exactly once with the fixed EVE mint and complete observed balance. It SHALL NOT automatically retry, rebuild, re-sign, or resubmit within or across iterations. Immediately after a non-blank signature is returned, it SHALL retain process-local pending data containing that signature, submitted EVE amount, and its calculated notification value or complete notification text before awaiting the signature.
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If burn submission fails without a usable signature and its outcome may be unknown, including an I/O or interruption path whose contract permits post-submission uncertainty, the service SHALL conservatively suspend further burn submissions for the current process. It MAY continue ordinary iteration work that does not submit another burn. Recovery SHALL require external reconciliation followed by a complete process restart, not a Burner service stop/start operation.
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#### Scenario: Burn returns a signature
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- **WHEN** the wallet submits the complete observed EVE balance and returns a non-blank signature
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- **THEN** pending state is retained before the service begins finalization waiting
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#### Scenario: Submission outcome may be unknown without a signature
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- **WHEN** burn submission fails or is interrupted without providing a usable signature and may already have reached Solana
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- **THEN** the service performs no further burn submission until external reconciliation and a complete process restart
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### Requirement: Finalized burn outcome governs completion
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Every known burn signature SHALL be awaited through the Solana blockchain at `FINALIZED` with exactly the configured finalization timeout. `SUCCEEDED` SHALL authorize notification; `FAILED` SHALL log the slot and complete on-chain failure details, clear pending state, and send no notification; `TIMED_OUT` and `IOException` SHALL keep the pending signature because its result remains unknown; and `InterruptedException` SHALL preserve interruption and pending state. None of these outcomes SHALL cause automatic transaction resubmission.
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#### Scenario: Burn finalizes successfully
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- **WHEN** the submitted signature reaches `FINALIZED` without an on-chain error
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- **THEN** the service may perform the notification attempt associated with that exact burn
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#### Scenario: Burn fails on-chain
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- **WHEN** the signature reaches `FINALIZED` with an on-chain error
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- **THEN** the service logs its slot and complete error, clears pending state, and never announces that burn
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#### Scenario: Finalized result remains unknown
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- **WHEN** finalization times out or communication fails
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- **THEN** the service retains the exact signature and later awaits it again without submitting another burn
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### Requirement: Exactly one post-finalization notification attempt
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Only after a burn reaches successful `FINALIZED` status, the service SHALL invoke the bound notification service exactly once with this structure, using the burn signature rather than any swap signature:
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```text
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🔥🔥🔥 We have bought back and burned <EVE_AMOUNT> EVE (Evelyn IOU tokens, value $<USD_VALUE>) to reduce the circulating supply! 🔥🔥🔥
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Proof:
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https://solscan.io/tx/<BURN_TRANSACTION_SIGNATURE>
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```
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The EVE amount SHALL use plain decimal notation without unnecessary trailing zeroes or scientific notation. The USD value SHALL have exactly two decimal places using half-up monetary rounding. The blank line before `Proof:` SHALL be preserved. Before invoking delivery, the service SHALL make the completed pending burn ineligible for another attempt. Delivery failure SHALL be logged without notification secrets and SHALL NOT retry notification or repeat the burn.
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#### Scenario: Successful finalized burn is announced
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- **WHEN** 10 EVE with a calculated value of 150.225 USDT reaches successful `FINALIZED` status under a burn signature
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- **THEN** one message reports `10 EVE`, `$150.23`, preserves the blank line, and links to that burn signature
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#### Scenario: Notification delivery fails
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- **WHEN** the sole notification invocation throws
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- **THEN** the service logs a non-secret failure, clears completed state, and never retries either notification or burn
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### Requirement: Exact token-capped amount and per-currency reserve
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The service SHALL select the lesser of positive `balance - minimumReserve` and the input UUID's maximum token amount, then round downward to mint precision. It SHALL skip non-positive results and SHALL never exceed either bound through rounding. Input selection SHALL require no input/USDC Ticker observation. Maxima SHALL limit buybacks only; EVE burns SHALL remain uncapped. Native SOL reserves SHALL use observed balance without estimating future fees.
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#### Scenario: SyrupUSDC maximum is lower than spendable balance
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- **WHEN** SyrupUSDC balance is 0.5, its reserve is 0.095, and its maximum is 0.2
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- **THEN** 0.2 SyrupUSDC is selected without requesting a SyrupUSDC/USDC observation
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#### Scenario: SyrupUSDC spendable balance is lower than the maximum
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- **WHEN** SyrupUSDC balance is 0.245, its reserve is 0.095, and its maximum is 0.2
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- **THEN** 0.150 SyrupUSDC is selected before downward mint-precision rounding
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#### Scenario: Reserve consumes the balance
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- **WHEN** the current balance is equal to or below that entry's minimum reserve
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- **THEN** no amount of that currency is intentionally swapped
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#### Scenario: USDT maximum preserves the production bound
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- **WHEN** USDT balance is 0.35, its reserve is 0.1, and its maximum is 0.25
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- **THEN** 0.25 USDT is selected before downward mint-precision rounding
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#### Scenario: Precision rounding never increases the spend
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- **WHEN** the lesser of spendable balance and maximum is 0.1509999 and the mint supports six decimals
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- **THEN** the service selects 0.150999, and if downward rounding instead produces zero the input is skipped
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#### Scenario: Native transaction fees
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- **WHEN** native SOL is selected with a configured reserve
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- **THEN** the service enforces the reserve against the observed balance only and does not estimate fees, even though later fees may reduce the final balance or cause execution to fail
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### Requirement: Production burner accepts USDT and SyrupUSDC
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The production Hub SHALL configure USDT first with reserve 0.1 and maximum input 0.25 USDT, and SyrupUSDC second with reserve 0.095 and maximum input 0.2 SyrupUSDC. These SHALL be token-denominated limits without a USD-value guarantee. The existing burner wallet, Jupiter route selection, registration, hourly interval, slippage, EVE/USDT freshness, confirmation settings and burn recovery behavior SHALL be preserved without new Ticker sources or history storage.
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#### Scenario: Production inputs and settings
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- **WHEN** the Hub constructs the production burner
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- **THEN** it supplies the two exact reserves and maxima as MoneyAmount values in USDT-then-SyrupUSDC priority and retains the other existing production arguments
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### Requirement: Pending swaps reconcile before new input selection
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After pending-burn priority, a retained swap SHALL be checked read-only by its original signature at CONFIRMED or stronger in a bounded operation. Success, on-chain failure or demonstrated non-executed expiry SHALL clear it and permit newly read balances to drive at most one new swap. Unknown, absent without expiry proof or I/O outcomes SHALL remain pending without a new swap while allowing existing EVE burns. Interruption SHALL propagate with pending state intact.
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#### Scenario: Original swap resolves
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- **WHEN** a later check resolves the original signature as successful, definitively failed or proven non-executed and expired
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- **THEN** pending swap state is cleared, complete failure details are logged when applicable, and any new selection uses newly read balances
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#### Scenario: Original swap remains unresolved
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- **WHEN** a later check times out, lacks trustworthy expiry/history evidence, observes only lower commitment or encounters I/O failure
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- **THEN** the same pending signature is retained for the next scheduled iteration, no new swap occurs and the existing EVE burn path still runs
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#### Scenario: Burn remains pending
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- **WHEN** both a swap and a burn are pending at iteration start
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- **THEN** only the burn signature is awaited and no swap reconciliation or new transaction is performed
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### Requirement: Safe swap recovery diagnostics
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Swap diagnostics SHALL identify canonical input symbol/UUID, attempted amount, known signature, submission or reconciliation state, safe cause details and next action. Timeout SHALL be described as unknown. Credentials, arbitrary provider/signer bodies and serialized transaction payloads SHALL NOT be logged. Pending swap state SHALL remain process-local; restart SHALL lose it and require external reconciliation before safely resuming uncertain activity.
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#### Scenario: Unknown outcome is diagnosed
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- **WHEN** a swap outcome remains unknown
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- **THEN** diagnostics identify whether its original signature will be checked next iteration or manual investigation is required, without exposing secret or payload data
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